[1] University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences, ORCID: 0009-0002-9200-2478, olena.siden@helsinki.fi
[2] Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, Faculty of Philology, ORCID: 0000-0002-1550-8734, alina.shkurat@gmail.com
Abstract
A crisis can be a powerful tool for populist actors, especially during elections. This paper analyzes how Marine Le Pen used the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a discursive tool to promote crisis narratives on national and international levels in her Twitter communication during the 2022 French presidential campaign. It argues that the Russo-Ukrainian War served as a source of crisis performance in Le Pen’s political communication, framed as an external threat that reinforced internal antagonism between “the people” and “the elite” to deepen polarization in French society. Drawing on Wodak’s theoretical framework, this study identifies key discursive strategies for the construction of war discourse in Le Pen’s Twitter communication. Nomination, predication, and argumentation emerged as predominant strategies, enabling Le Pen to identify in- and out-groups among political actors as well as to construct and promote her leadership. By shifting focus away from Russia’s role as the aggressor and downplaying Ukraine’s agency, she presented the war as a geopolitical struggle between major powers, while emphasizing its domestic economic consequences, such as rising prices. Her presentation of self-other relations shifted depending on the target audience – French, European, or international – allowing her to adapt her messaging to different contexts. The findings highlight the relevance of understanding how populist actors utilize international crises to advance political agendas. It provides insights into the mechanisms of crisis discourse, polarization, and the strategic construction of narratives in populist communication.
Keywords: Twitter communication, crisis discourse, discursive strategy, critical discourse analysis, Russo-Ukrainian War
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