The Deconstruction of the Concept of *Normalization* within the Context of the Settler-Colonialism in Palestine: The Duality of Acceptance and Rejection

Mai Albzour

*I consistently tried to explain to the Black that he was normalizing in a way or another and to the White that he was misled and misleading.*

— Frantz Fanon

Abstract

The concept of *normalization* was associated with the peace process with Israelis, in both, Arab and Palestinian context. The term has different interpretations depending on context, and it becomes more complex when referring to a direct relationship between the colonized and their colonizers in the context of the settler colonialism in Palestine, therefore, it is a highly controversial concept. The political debates over the concept, mostly describe it as a term that refers to recognizing the state of Israel and conducting normal relations with Israelis. The term ‘normalization’ has been used by Michel Foucault in describing the processes of psychological dominance imposed by an authority’s penal role in modern societies and its influence on human groups. One of the most prominent purposes of “Post-modern” theories is to resist the colonial dominant narratives by discovering the Scattered Historical Contingencies. Given this premise, this paper has the following objectives: To offer a critical, deconstructivist analysis for the concept of *normalization* in the context of the settler-colonial regime, and to study the genealogies of this concept (Généalogie) by investigating the relevant historical hypotheses: 1) there are historical differences regarding the appearance of the expression phonologically and its practice (political, official, and public practice); and 2) there are historical epistemological transformations that took place with regards to Arabs’ perceptions, and the political reflection, which shaped the image and the relationship with the colonizer, due to the practice of the concept *normalization* in politics. I will analyse these historical hypotheses by using a synthesis of settler colonial theoretical frameworks and those of socio-political psychology such as Frantz Fanon’s theoretical contributions, to investigate political discourse, including discourse in peace treaties, politics related to the Palestinian and Arab national identities, and the relevant political discourses used by politicians who reject *normalization*.

Keywords

Normalization, Settler colonialism, Intergroup relations, History, National identity

---

1 University of Lausanne/Switzerland, mai.albzour@unil.ch and mai.albzour@yahoo.com
2 Quoted from (Fanon, 2004, p. 239) Arabic translation, while in the English version it is “I have ceaselessly striven to show the Negro that in a sense he makes himself abnormal; to show the white man that he is at once the perpetrator and the victim of a delusion.” (Fanon, 2008, p200).
**Introduction**

In 1978, and after the signing of the Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, a major shift took place in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The signing marked the beginning of a new phase of official Arab recognition of the establishment of the State of Israel and the emergence of normal relations with it (Elmessiri, 1999). Since then, the term *normalization* has been extended on both the official and popular levels to describe the acceptance of the Zionist idea on the one hand, and dealing with its denominators on the other (Awwad, Salem, & Obeed, 2007).

The establishment of normal relations with Israel in various fields - economic, political, academic and cultural - has been promoted by the Arab governments that have kept peace (e.g. Egypt & Jordan) or wanted peace with Israel, (e.g. some of Arab Gulf States recently). Moreover, some Arab intellectuals and artists were supportive to the policy of normalization too (Mi’Ari, 1999). Other Arab governments were still opponents to the Zionist idea or Israeli occupation in Palestine and rejected and condemned normalization policies (e.g. Lebanon & Syria). Additionally, promotion of the anti-normalization movements and campaigns on the popular, intellectual and political levels was wide spread (Committee for the Defence of Arab culture-Cairo, 1993). According to the anti-normalization voices, the term *normalization* has negative connotations such as acceptance of defeat, and adherence to colonial order and vision (Albzour, 2017). Therefore, *normalization* is a controversial term; it has different interpretations depending on the political position of the actors, which, in turn, influences their representations of the categorization of behaviours of *normalization*. In other words, the Arabs’ national group’s boundaries (which determine who are the patriots vs. normalizers) are not clear, nor unified amongst the Arab and Palestinians. For example, many political and popular debates are emerging over stigmatizing Arab figures’ visits to the “West Bank”, and over whether these visits are forms of *normalization* or not (e.g. Alloush, 2013).

Academic inquiry into the phenomena of *normalization* was limited to two levels: 1) empirical investigations about the impact of intergroup “positive” contact on the Palestinians’ attitudes towards *normalization* (Albzour, Penic, Nasser, & Green, 2019; Mi’Ari, 1999); and 2) historical analysis focusing on criticizing the policy of *normalization* by addressing the political, cultural and economic reasons for *normalization* (Muhsin Awwad, 1988; Kautharani, 1995; Nofal, 2010; Qarqar, 2011; Samarah, 2011). Moreover, public opinion articles on *normalization* are widespread in social media. Although the previous political, sociological, conventional, and historical work agreed on the emergence of the concept of *normalization* in 1978 (Muhsin Awwad et al., 2007; Elmessiri, 1999; Yaqeen, 2003), there is a need for further historical investigation of this constructed phenomenon, which has become a truth in the present. The novelty of this research lies in the need of uncovering the power dynamics of the language by challenging the conventional historiography through using Critical Discourse analysis (CDA), whose main concerns, are “the critique of relations of power and ideology in society at large” (O’Regan & Betzel, 2016, p. 2) and unearthing how discourse (re) produces asymmetric power relations in identity policies (Parker, 2013). What is more, CDA is a flexible approach as it is “a multi/inter/transdisciplinary and multi methodological approach” (Wodak & Fairclough, 2013, p. 202).
1. **Background**

1.1. *Normalization* within the settler colonial context

In the social sciences, the term *normalization* appeared in Foucault’s book “*Discipline and Punish*, 1991” when he discussed the processes of psychological dominance imposed by an authority’s penal code in modern societies. The goal is to influence human groups; to control them socially, mentally and physically to achieve a state of behavioural discipline, where people have one pattern of thought, behaviour and responses (Foucault, 1991; Paternek, 1987). It is possible to conclude that Foucault (1991) used the term *normalization* to describe a dual, synchronous process of *normalization*, which is, *normalization* of thought and practice (behaviour of human groups).

*Normalization* of thought involves a group of social standards and values issued by the modern states’ penalizing authorities and institutions, making these standards “normal” as part of a social schema which represses and nullifies individuals’ free will. This, also, creates authoritative psychological tools of punishment (such as monitoring) and social standards that legalize the *normalization* of the individuals within said social system.

Under the status of settler colonialism in Palestine, many researchers agree that the definition of *normalization* means to recognize the state of Israel and its right of existence, which entails initiating normal relations with it in various fields (Muhsin Awwad, 1988; Kautharani, 1995; Mi’Ari, 1999; Samarah, 2011; Yaqeen, 2003). On the global level, the concept is used in political sciences to refer to the regaining of normal relations between two states after a conflict, such as what happened amongst European states after World War II through peaceful reconciliation agreements sponsored by the UN. An example of this is the *normalization* agreements between Yugoslavia and Croatia (“Agreement on Normalization,” 1996). Additionally, in Legal-history studies, the term “normalization” refers to the process of normalizing foreign relation laws within the framework of the UN, which took place after World War II. (For more information, refer to: Sitaraman & Wuerth, 2014).

It seems essential here to refer to the different connotations of the term *normalization* under the settler-colonial status in Palestine, as opposed to the term’s universal use. In this context, two observations can be made regarding *normalization*: first, *normalization* with the colonizing entity always refers to initiating “normal” relations, not the revival of such relations, given the fact that this colonizing entity is new, emerged in 1948. The second observation, and arguably the more important, refers to initiating relations after ending a state of “feud” or “conflict”, be it physical or ideological. However, under a settler-colonial status, the term refers to initiating such relations before reaching a peaceful resolution, or before ending the state of disagreement. The Israeli use of the term combines the meaning of *normalization* at a global scale and the meaning of peace (reconciliation); Awwad et al (2007) point out that the concept of peace was the basis for the term *normalization* as used by Israeli group, in which case Palestinian/Arab demands are put off and associated with *normalization* as perceived by the colonizer. In this scenario, *normalization* becomes the first step towards peace, not one of its outcomes. In other words, *normalization* would lead to the end of conflict, unlike the internationally recognized process of conflict resolution which leads to *normalization*. 
In conclusion, the basic idea behind colonial concept of “normalization” is to gain recognition, to gain the “other” Palestinian/Arab recognition of the Zionist idea and to legalize it, which would reinvent the Zionist "other", and lead to the acceptance of the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine, in addition to establishing “normal” relations with it. Normalization carries a dismantling of the idea of rejection through gaining recognition as perceived by the colonizers.

1.2. Theoretical rationale

“Post-modern” and “Post-Colonial” theoretical frameworks were first established by persecuted nations, or the so called “Third World” countries, in accordance with the dominant divisions of “West, East” and “North, South”. “Modern Discourse” was utilized to normalize the concepts of development and unequal relations between the persecuted and persecutors throughout history (Bhabha, 2012). Accordingly, one of the most prominent purposes of “Post-modern” theories is to resist this dominance by discovering the scattered historical contingencies.

Due to this, a de-constructive analysis of the (made discourse) of normalization in the settler colonial context in Palestine is needed. The label of normalization has become a natural construct, crystallized at a historical moment of conceptual transformation in the Arab context. In order to challenge the conventional historiography of normalization, this paper seeks to track the power dynamic of the emergence of normalization, by investigating the relevant historical hypotheses of:

First, there are historical differences regarding the emergence of the term normalization, phonologically and practice wise. Second, there is a historical epistemological transformation that took place with regards to Arabs’ perceptions, identity policies, and the political representations that shaped the image and the relationship with the colonizer, due to the practice of the policy of normalization.

The critical historical investigation in this paper depends on Michel Foucault’s genealogical method that “provides people with the critical skills for analysing, and uncovering the relationship between knowledge, power and the human subject in modern society and the conceptual tools to understand how their being has been shaped by historical forces” (Crowley, 2009, p. 2). According to Nietzsche (1967), genealogy is based on disintegration, in the sense of the search for origin; beyond any beginning there are other beginnings, and other narratives that have vanished through traditional history. Genealogy is about searching for the origin of our moral judgments. Foucault (1978) stated that what we find in the beginnings (of the phenomenon, or of the linguistic use as an expression of a phenomenon) does not necessarily have to express its original identity. This view emphasizes Nietzsche’s theoretical view that “meaning is the will of power”, where language is the signs and symbols of the will of the power produced (Nietzsche, 1967).

Moreover, normalization is an expression of a moral judgment of intergroup relations. Using social psychological theorizing of intergroup relations might be effectual to track this research hypotheses. Accordingly, critical social psychology through history was based on different theoretical bases, (such as those of Marxism, Feminism, Post-Structuralism, and psychoanalysis) while the theories of “Post Modernism” were all but present (Hook, 2005). As such, Hook believes that “Post-Modernism” theories may significantly contribute to critical social psychology by
resurrecting the form of analysis that is based on psycho-politics, more specifically, by resurrecting the intellectual contributions of Frantz Fanon. Moreover, Foucault’s genealogical method is a method of investigation of the condition of the made discourse, or a present truth; it is not a method of searching for the truth, or a moral judgment (Tamboukou, 1999). Through the genealogical approach, this paper is an attempt to merge the social psychological theorizing of intergroup relations (i.e., social identity theory; Reicher, 2004) and the settler colonial theoretical frameworks; more precisely, Fanon’s theoretical contributions on nationalism (Fanon, 1963) and social psychological aspects of the relationship between colonizers and the colonized people (Fanon, 1952, 2004).

The theory of Social identity contribution is used here to capture the role of the political discourse in defining the “self” vs. the “other”, drawing the group boundaries, and setting the normative aspect of the relations between the “self” and the “other”. However, the use of Fanon’s contribution (Fanon, 1963) is employed to distinguish between the types of national liberation tendencies amongst the Arab states with regard to their vision of “normalization”. Moreover, in the discussion section, some of the theoretical aspects of Fanon (1952) will be used to clarify the Arab’s adaptation of the colonial terminology (e.g. how the consciousness of Blacks dissolves in the White's vision of the Black’s freedom).

This research analyses political discourse data, including; politics related to the Arab national identities (Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalism, Arab league statements, Camp David’s peace treaties, and the relevant political discourses used by politicians (Arab Parliaments) who reject normalization. In addition to that, in this analysis, I use the term of in-group (member) to refer to the Arab or Arab state that belongs and adheres to the limits of Arab national identity, while, I use the term of the “out-group” for the members who don’t belong or adhere to these limits. Moreover, in order to distinguish between Arabs and Zionists; concepts of the “self” and the “other” were used. Zionist the “other” is considered a catalyst for the emergence and crystallization of the Arab nationalism in the last century.

2. Methodology

2.1. Research questions

Foucault's (1970, 1981) contributions were part of the main basis of the development of Parker's (2013) levels of discourse analysis. Augoustinos notes that “Parker's (2013) four levels of analysis in discursive research ranging from the micro to the macro are reminiscent of Willem Doise's, (1986) organizing of social psychology into four levels of analysis: individual, interpersonal, intergroup and collective” (Augoustinos, 2013, p. 245). Therefore, in this critical investigation, the

---

3 In sociology “An in-group is a group with which we identify and to which we belong. An out-group is a group with which we don’t identify and to which we do not belong” (Hughes & Kroehler, 2009, p102).

4 Originally used in the field of philosophy by Hegel (see, Russon, 2011). In the social sciences, its use refers to the limits of collective or individual identities according to the interaction with the other (e.g. Mead, 1934)).
research questions are based on the intergroup perspectives, in order to test the hypotheses and to track the origin of the term *normalization* within the Arab nationalist movements.

This investigation will tackle the following questions within two historical periods, (A=before 1978), and B= within the year of 1978 in the Arab context:

1. How the Arabs (the “self”) and the Zionists (the “other”) were identified in the Arab national discourse?
2. How did these national discourses deal with the fact that some Arab states declared their “normalization” or acceptance of the settler colonial structure in Palestine? *(the “in-group” vs. the “out-group” among Arab members)*
3. When and how did both the term *normalization* and its practices emerge?

### 2.2. Data

To answer the research questions, various texts were analyzed, including books, political speeches, summits and conferences’ reports, international treaties, parliamentary and political parties’ statements. In all data texts, the analysis tracked the units of analysis that relate to the texts’ definitions of ("self" and "other"), (in-group and out-group), in addition to the terms of normalization and its synonyms.

In order to avoid falling into the trap of data selective selection, “cherry picking,” I had all data analysed comprehensively. i.e. all records of the Arab summits between the years 1964-1979 and all the Arab states’ immediate responses on Camp David accord in 1978 were covered.

### 2.3. Selected data before 1978


### 2.4. Selected data after 1978

1. Camp David peace accord 1978 and Egyptian Israeli peace treaty 1979. 2. The statements of the Prime Ministers Council issued by: Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in Damascus (which included the presidents of Syria, Yemen, Libya, Algeria and the PLO)\(^5\). 3. The statement of the Ninth Arab Summit (Baghdad, 1978)

\(^5\) Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS)’s book (1978) that documents the texts related to the Camp David accords and all Arab states’ political reactions, national reactions and reactions of factions.

The following sections will answer the research questions. The third section dealt with the Arab nationalism perspectives of the “self” vs. “other”, “in-group” vs. “out-group” before 1978. The sub-section of (3.3) dealt with the emergence of the practices of normalization before 1978. In this section, extracted text examples from the selected data before 1978 were used.

The fourth section addressed the emergence of the term of normalization in 1978. The sub-section (4.1) addressed changes in the perceptions of the “self” vs. “other” in Camp David peace accord 1978 and Egyptian Israeli peace treaty 1979. While the subsection (4.2) dealt with Arabs’ reflections of the Camp David accord, by addressing the changes of Arabs’ perceptions of the “in-group” vs. “out-group” members. The analysis in section four, showed the need for analysing the Arabs’ rejection of Camp David accord separately; section five addressed the themes of this rejection. The sixth section answered the questioning of the emergence of the term of normalization within the Arabs’ rejection statements.

### 3. Analysis: Arab nationalism perspectives before 1978

#### 3.1. The pre-coinage stage; before 1978

After the Second World War, and specifically after the catastrophe of Palestine (Nakba) in 1948, the influence of the Arab nationalist movement increased on the official and popular levels. This rise was attributed to the pivotal role played by the then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (Al-Hindi, 2012). The Arab Nationalist movement, in the era of the creation of Israel, was the main ideological incubator to confront the settler colonial project in Palestine. In his book *The Philosophy of Revolution*, (Abdel Nasser, 1954), it is clear that the Palestinian Nakba is one of the most significant historical events facing the Arab identity and its nationalist discourse; in reference to the Palestinian Nakba and the war in which he participated, Gamal Abdel Nasser states: “I realized that fighting in Palestine was not on foreign land and was not an emotional act; it was a duty to defend oneself,… Arab nations engaged in this war zealously in an effort to protect themselves!” (Abdel Nasser, 1954, p. 63).

Literature in the field of social psychology indicates that the threat could lead to a collective social identity awakening (Reicher, 2004). In turn, this calls for social standards and values which shape a movement for social change, where identity creation becomes a call for social change, on the one hand, and movements in the face of another social change, on the other hand. Accordingly, the
Social Identity Theory is considered to be one of the theories that attempted, in its initial stages, to interpret when and how social structures and standards influence human and individual behaviour, and how this social context influences social identity paradigms (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979). This contextual effect is reflected in the clarity of Abdel Nasser's speech; “This region has those who seek to become the (hero), and I believe that this role is nearing our homeland. This role is not the leaders’, but is a matter of responding and interacting with the surrounding conditions to achieve change… It is a new attempt to create a world power in this region which has power and has a positive role in building the future of humanity” (Abdel Nasser, 1954, p. 61).

The theoretical proposition suggested by the psychology of social groups’ identity formation indicates the emerging leadership’s needs to answer central questions that revolve around identification of the self: Who are we? What do we want? Who is the other? How do we face this other to achieve what we want? (Reicher et al., 2010). In the case of national identity, political aspects are also included, such as the forming of social-psychological boundaries with the other, or the reforming of these boundaries in some cases. This is clearly presented in the Arab-Nationalist discourse. For example, the “Philosophy of the Revolution” states: “this brainstorming is not an attempt to compose a book… But is an attempt to discover the “us”; so that we can explore ourselves, who we are and what our role is… Our goals and the energy needed to achieve them, to discover the conditions of the field in which we do battle to free our nation from all its shackles” (Abdel Nasser, 1954, p. 7).

### 3.2. “Self” vs. the “Other” in the Arab national discourse

Nationalist rhetoric defines the “in-group” as the Arab circle, as a group who has been historically and culturally unified. Additionally, the group of "Arab", defined its economic, political, and geographic unity, is presented as facing threat from the imperial and colonial power represented by the Zionist entity in Palestine. Therefore, facing Zionism is one important element in defining the Arab "self". While the "other" Zionist and imperial powers were defined as the "enemy" of the Arab, the Philosophy of the Revolution states that “There is one enemy, even if he wears different disguises”, the other was labelled as “Zionists” imperial powers, and “Jews”6. Accordingly, the Arab national identity at that era was established to face foreign threats. The relationship with the other was shaped in accordance with the Arab group’s goals, such as the goal of liberation of the Arab land of Palestine, and on that, the only way to accomplish that was by unifying the Arab struggle in a way that would make this struggle and liberation from the Zionist oppression the basis of Arab nationalism.

---

6. I think that this description, “Jews”, has entrenched the lack of clarity of the relationship between Arabs and Arab Jews later. Moreover, it might have even been one of the factors that contributed to the shaping of the Zionist identity amongst them (For more information on the role of political discourse in creating national groups, refer to (Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006).
Thus, we find that the Arab national identity is based on a complete rejection of the settler colonialism in Palestine. This has been reflected in the policies of the Arab League, and has been consistently expressed in the following summits: The First Arab summit (Cairo, 1964), the Second Arab summit (Alexandria, 1964), the Third Arab summit (Casablanca, 1965), and the Fourth (AL Khartoum, 1967), all of which has expressed rejection towards the recognition of Israel, rejection of the historical right which the Zionist narrative proclaims, and complete rejection of the UN resolution of 1947; the division of Palestine resolution (181) (“Arab League summit,” 2019; Database, 2019). As such, the Zionist, the “other”, has been defined as just the enemy, and there was no intergroup mobility amongst the two groups (Arabs and Zionists).

Among the national anti-colonial movements, Fanon, (1963) distinguishes between two types of movements. The first remains in subordination status to the colonial powers even if they take the form of liberation, while the second is a national movement in a true liberation sense that seeks to disengage from the colonizer. The Arab national revolutionary doctrine fits Fanon’s concept of struggling against colonization, as an expression of the complete rejection of the colonial structure.

3.3. "In-group" vs. the “Out-group” Arab members in the Arab nationalism

Under the dominance of the Arab nationalist libertarian rhetoric, the term normalization was not used to describe calls to accept the settler colonialism in Palestine or to deal with it yet. Even when it took a form of “negotiations as part of the struggle” it was still described as a major “betrayal”, as “surrender”, “collusion” and as conspiring against the unity of Arabs and the whole libertarian struggle. This was clear in the Arab nationalist rhetoric, and its public, represented in the reaction of Habib Bourguiba’s famous statement in Jericho, 1965, and in his political initiatives against the colonialism in Palestine which he presented to the Arab League’s council. In his speech, Bourguiba called the Arab community to accept the policy of “the stages” and to abandon the policy of “whole or nothing”. He stated that “As for the policy of the “whole or nothing,” it brought us to the defeat in Palestine and reduced us to the sad situation we are struggling with today” (Tunisian President Bourguiba’s Speech in Jericho—English (1965); 2014). He also encouraged Arabs and Palestinians to accept the UN Division resolution of 181, and proposed an idea to deal with the settler-colonialism in Palestine through negotiating with “the opposing forces” (as he labelled them) when needed or fighting them if negotiation did not work, while abiding to technique of “take and demand”, mirroring his experience in Tunisia. Bourguiba’s initiative was completely rejected by the Arab League’s council. Following that, and after Egypt’s fall out with Tunisia, Tunisia boycotted the Third Arab League summit in Casablanca in 1965. Moreover, this initiative and Bourguiba were accused of treason and conspiracy by the Arab public and official bodies.

To sum up, the political representations of the Arab national identity have limited the relations with the Zionist, the "other", in a clear duality, with clear borderlines, the duality of rejection and acceptance of the settler colonialism, which implies the duality of “patriotism” and “treason” as part of the Arab national agenda for change.

3.4. The emergence of the official practices of normalization before 1978

In 1967, and after Israel's victory in the Six-Day War (the Arabs -including Palestinians- call this setback, the “Naksa,” referring to their defeat and to the second displacement of Palestinians after
the 1948 setback, the “Nakba”), Israel gained control over new territories captured from the Arab countries that participated in that war (e.g. Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, Golan Heights from Syria and “West Bank” and Gaza Strip, which were under the rule of Jordan and Egypt respectively). In the years of 1973-1974, the Arab/Palestinian libertarian doctrine soon began to tread on shaky grounds for political reasons, including the results of the Naksa in 1967, and the role of this defeat in empowering political conflict amongst Arab states regarding their positions with regard to the Palestinian issue. For example, the website of the Arab League stated that the Fifth Arab Summit in Rabat in 1969, with 14 participating states, “with the purpose of putting forward an Arab strategy to face Israel” was not effective because “the leaders of the Arab states became divided before issuing any resolutions or a concluding statement ”(“Arab League summitt,” 2019). In addition, the Sixth Arab Summit in Algeria in 1973 affirmed the Arab world’s willingness to engage in negotiations to achieve peace with Israel based on the UN’s resolutions, such as resolution 242. The Summit’s resolutions included agreement on two terms for peace with Israel: The first was Israel’s withdrawal from all the Arab occupied territories, including Jerusalem. The second was that the Palestinian nation regains all constant national rights. It is worth mentioning that Libya and Iraq boycotted this summit.

The acceptance of UN resolutions indicates that the Arabs had abandoned their comprehensive liberation project from settler colonialism in Palestine on the one hand, and it refers to their implicit acceptance of the two-state solution. This was followed by the Arab League’s recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the soul legal representative of the Palestinian people, in its seventh summit in Rabat in 1974

To return to Bourguiba’s initiative in 1965, the power relations, at that time, imposed the label of “betrayal” on the objectives of Arab nationalism. Eight years later, after the 1967 defeat, which led to the weakness of the doctrine of both Arab Libertarian rejection and Arab nationalism (Albzour, 2015) the Arab states decided to partially accept settler colonial structure in Palestine by approving UN resolutions and thus taking a similar position to Bourguiba. But, in this case, the criteria of the “in-group” and “out-group” Arab members had changed, depending on the differences in groups’ power relations and historical moment, where the acceptance of the settler colonialism in Palestine was not considered as betrayal. To sum up, all of these initiatives of normalization behaviours by the in-group members or the out-group ones was not stigmatized by the term “normalization” yet.

4. Emergence of the term normalization in the Arab context; after 1978

The use of the term normalization was one of the outcomes of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, sponsored by the USA, which were concluded by the Camp David accord in 1978 and the Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty in 1979. The Camp David accord was a central turning point in the relationship between Israel and the Arab world.

The accords stated: “Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another.” The Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt; 2013, p. 5). With this, the term normal relations, driven to Arabic from the English term “Normal” in accordance to the language of international law. As for the nature of the intended relations, article three of the
peace treaty signed in 1979 states: “normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people...” (Mohamed, 1979, p. 7). These relations are further explained in the third annex in the treaty, entitled “Protocols on the Relationship between the Two Parties”.

4.1. **“Self” vs. the “Other” within Camp David peace accord**

In the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, peace was defined in accordance to the American vision (which was in line with the Israeli vision) that required the establishment of friendly relations with the Zionist-settler-colonial entity before ending “conflict” (i.e. before fulfilling the United Nation’s resolutions, such as resolution 242), contrary to the meaning of peace according to the international legal language. This implies that the reconciliation process requires redefining social and political values and standards (Bar-Tal, 2000), and redefining of the other and the self, and the social-psychological boundaries between the so called parties in “conflict”. In confirmation, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty states in the second point of the third article:

> Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice. (Mohamed, 1979).

The peace agreement led to the redefinition of the “self” Egyptian vs. the “other” Zionist, by accepting the “other” and abandoning the Arab nationalist ideology that rejects the Zionist project. With this, according to the peace treaty, military resistance for liberation (previously allowed by the national rhetoric) was now recognized as “acts of transgression”, and the person who used to be “patriotic” was now seen as one committing acts of transgression.

4.2. **“In-group” vs. “Out-group” Arab members in the Arab reaction of Camp David in 1978**

To be precise in investigating the emergence of the term normalization, that was associated with “out-group” Arab members’ stigmatization for their acceptance of the settler colonialism in Palestine, I decided to go over all of the Arab states’ immediate responses in 1978 in addition to some of the political parties’ reactions, the parties that reacted immediately after the signing of Camp David in the same year (1978).

The statements of the Prime Ministers Council issued by Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco, the PLO, and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in Damascus (which included the presidents of Syria, Yemen, Libya, Algeria and the PLO) rejected the agreement in general, with differences in the rejections being linguistic
implicitness or explicitness. Oman’s statement was in favour of the agreement, and, later, Sudan’s statement was neutral.

The Arab states and Egyptian political parties who reject the peace accord, considered Egyptian government represented by Anwar Al-Sadat as an “out-group” member. Moreover, some Arab countries called for and boycotted Egypt politically and economical.

At this point, writing a genealogy “turned out to be an exciting adventure. There were a lot of things to be discovered...” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 201). Foucault’s genealogy does not “follow any certain methodology”, it is an open method against “all types of closed methodologies” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 201). Thus, while analysing with the “in-group” vs. “out-group” theme in the Arab political reaction of the Camp David accord, I expected to find the clear duality of acceptance and rejection of Israel and the peace accord, as it was clearly addressed in the political analysis literatures (e.g. Awwad, et al, 2007). But instead, through analysis of the national political discourse of the Arab governments rejecting the accords, it was clear that there are several levels of rejection; some of which hint at accepting the settler-colonial structure in Palestine by recognizing the conditions of the 242 and 181 UN resolutions, while others rejected the accord because of their adherence to the liberal doctrine. This result meets Fanon’s classification of the national movements. The responses of the Arab national opponents to the Camp David agreement were classified as true rejection or rejection based on the terms of negotiations with Israel. This outcome indicates the existence of the spirit and practices of normalization among the opponents of normalization, without using the term of normalization. In turn, this confirms that “normalization” took place, even in the voices of its opponents, before the emergence of the term in the Arab context.

As for the kinds of rejection, the thematic analysis below shows that there are two themes; first is the rejection on the basis of negotiation with Israel. Under this theme there are two sub themes (1. Rejection based on the UN Resolution 242, 2. Rejection based on the UN Resolution 181). The second theme is the libertarian rejection.

### 5. Themes of Rejection

#### 5.1. Rejection on the basis of negotiation with Israel

##### 5.1.1. United nations security council resolution 242 of 1967

In 1978, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Morocco, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, and the participants in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Conference indicated their objections to the contents of Camp David agreement. The specific objection was that the agreement ignored the resolutions of the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974; specifically, UN resolution 242, and granting Palestinian self-determination and representation via the PLO. For example, the Council of Ministers of Jordan’s statement declared: “Any just, final settlement has to clearly state the Palestinian people’s complete right for self-determination in the context of a comprehensive settlement”, and, “(t)here is a clear difference between positivity and love for peace, on the one hand, and sacrificing national positions, interests, and historic rights, on the other hand” (Institute
for Palestine Studies (IPS), 1978, P,115). The Saudi Council of Ministers stated, after praising Carter’s efforts, that Saudi Arabia “has reservations” towards the agreement because “Camp David is not considered an adequate final peace agreement” (IPS, 1978, p. 129). The Qatari Council of Ministers stated that the agreement “does not constitute a decent basis that can lead to a just, comprehensive settlement” (IPS, 1978, p. 142); while the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers declared that there would be no “Commitment to the Arab Summits’ resolutions, especially Rabat’s” (IPS, 1978, p. 143). Finally, Morocco explained “No solution is possible in the Eastern Arab region without Israel’s full withdrawal from all the Arab territories” which were occupied in 1967, in addition to withdrawing from Jerusalem (IPS, 1978, p. 167).

These parliamentary data (published by the respective Parliaments) did not even mention any objection against recognition of Israel, or the normalization of relations, but focused on objecting to the conditions of negotiations and the Arabs’ lack of commitment by embarking on a one-sided pacifist solution.

The participants in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Conference (SCC) held in Damascus, 1978, called for boycotting Egypt considering it as an “out-group” member. Article Five of the resolutions made in the SCC demanded the “ending (of) political and economic relations with the Egyptian regime, including organizations and companies, and implementing the Arab boycott resolutions to individuals who have dealings with the enemy” (IPS, 1978, p. 175). The Ninth Arab Summit in Baghdad also suspended Egypt’s membership, and moved the League’s headquarters elsewhere. The participants’ attitude and form of rejection can be observed in the Conferences’ documents, such as the opening speeches of Hafiz Al-Asad and Yasser Arafat. This was again indicated in the statement of the Ninth Arab Summit in Baghdad.

The Conference also deemed the Camp David accords a violation of the UN Charter and international law. This view can be discerned in the concluding statement of the SCC, when Sadat was accused of abandoning “the universal concept of just peace in the region which is based on full withdrawal from all Palestinian and Arab territories” (occupied in 1967) and on the recognition of self-determination and the establishment of an independent state” lead by the PLO as the soul legal representative of the Palestinian people” (IPS, 1978, p. 174). The same position can also be observed in the PLO’s Executive Committee’s statement, the National Conference in Jerusalem’s statement, the Municipal and Local Councils’ statement in Gaza Strip, and in Al-Ba’ath Party’s National Leadership’s statement in Syria that stated: “the treaties of Camp David, at core, stray away from all international treaties, undermine all the UN resolutions, and contradict all the international understanding of the terms of just and permanent peace in the region” (IPS, 1978, p. 133).

The rejecting rhetoric was also different from previous rejecting positions in the way it described the Camp David accord, and in describing Sadat as its composer. The concluding statement of the Summit, the Syrian Ba’ath Party’s statement, and the inaugural statements of Arafat and Asad described the accord as “the biggest Zionist and imperial conspiracy against Arabs”, and considered it “defeatist”, “a betrayal”, “submissive”, and “collaborative”. Additionally, Sadat was described as a “defeatist”, “traitor”, “ally”, “collaborator” with the colonizing imperial powers, and with the Zionist enemy. (IPS, 1978, pp. 169-170). Amongst all the previous descriptions, the word normalization was not mentioned, as stated above.

This form of rejection appeared in the Tunisian Council of Ministers’ statement. In contrast to the previous type of rejection, this statement had a greater degree of rejection of the treaty arguing that it ignored the Division Resolution 181 of 1947, and for ignoring the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In Tunisian’s statement,

The Tunisian government has followed with full interest the talks in Camp David. The Government considers its duty to recall the principles on which the Tunisian position is based towards the Palestinian and Middle East issues: First, respect for the international legitimacy of the United Nations resolution of 1947, which provides for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It should be noted that Tunisia is the first to call for adherence to this principle in addressing the question of Palestine. (IPS, 1978, pp. 127-128).

It is important to point out the importance of the language used in political discourse to convey rejection. Most of the political analysis literature agrees on adopting rejection, and revolutionary position. This literature describes the states that participated in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Conference (SCC) as the pioneers of this revolutionary stand, excluding the Tunisian stand that was firmer in rejection. I think that this exclusion was based on two reasons: the first has to do with the SCC’s boycott of Egypt, and the second has to do with the SCC’s discourse of the Arab nationalist tendencies and the relevant revolutionary rhetoric; where we can detect expressions such as “colonization”, “the enemy”, “betrayal”, “surrender”, and “military resistance” are still being used in the Conference’s discourse.

However, this rejection is still defined as rejection based on the terms of negotiations, not through liberation from the settler colonialism structure in Palestine. Even though the Arab resolutions were a form of strategic tactics (in accordance with the stage’s policy), and even though their objective was complete liberation later on, they still recognized the colonizing system, according to the rhetoric used within, and recognized Israel in exchange for withdrawal from “the Arab territories occupied in 1967”. As for rejection in the Tunisian discourse (also based on negotiations), it goes back to the previous initiative by Bourguiba in 1965, and is also based on the Division resolution which grants Palestinians a bigger share of territories than those listed in resolution 242, which was labelled as a treason in that historical period, as mentioned earlier.

5.2. Libertarian rejection

Despite Iraq and Libya’s participation in the SCC in Damascus (1978), and the two states’ agreement to the content of the Conference’s concluding statement, the political discourse of president Gaddafi, the Iraqi president Ahmad Hasan Al-Baker, and statements by the Leadership
of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council, and Communist Al-Ba’ath national Arab Party in Iraq included rejection based on refusing to recognize the settler-colonial entity. For example, in his statement in the anniversary of the Italian evacuation from Libya, Gaddafi referred to the Egyptian’s “traitorous” position in the form of recognizing the “enemy”; he also stated that “what the Egyptian president did is a disaster for the whole Arab nation, as it has removed Egypt from its Arab origins, and has taken it out of the fight”. He also insisted that “for the first time, the Egyptian president recognized an enemy who occupies a land that is not his, the Palestinian land. Gaddafi also questioned the legitimacy of the settler saying, “the Israeli residents of occupied Palestine have hailed from Europe, Russia, and America, so how can we accept that they are resident of the Middle East or the East region of the Arab world, and that this is their land?” He asserted that “… if the defeated Egyptian president has accepted that the residents of Arab Palestine be people from Europe and America, we will not accept that” (IPS, 1978, p. 146).

For the statement by the Al-Ba’ath Party’s National Leadership in Iraq was different from all the previous statements. It labelled the Zionist Movement as a settler-colonialist and noted that “this Zionism is a settler-colonial, racist, extremist, expansive movement full of malice and aggression. The contradiction between it and the Arab Revolutionary Movement cannot be resolved through negotiations or compromises, but through full confrontation until the national objectives are achieved” (IPS, 1978, p. 186). The statement clearly and repetitively used the term taming (in reference to what we call today normalization) (IPS, 1978, p. 187). The statement criticized Arab governments’ responses to the efforts of Zionism and Imperialism to get them to accept Resolution 242, which allowed “submissive” and “taming” agendas to emerge.

More importantly, according to Al-Ba’ath Party’s statement, accepting Resolution 242 had paved the way for responses to the surrender represented in Sadat’s visit to Israel (in 1977), which the statement declared as “a compromise for the enemy, on the one hand, and a blow to the spirit of resistance and confrontation, on the other hand” (IPS, 1978, p. 187). Additionally, the Arab opponent powers stated their ultimate purpose as being to achieve an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and to establish a Palestinian state in the “West Bank” and the Gaza Strip with full recognition of the Zionist enemy...” (IPS, 1978, p. 188). This Iraqi and Libyan libertarian position which rejects the settler colonialism in Palestine was rejected by the Rejecting Front of (The SCC Front) itself.

It is worth mentioning that all the above-mentioned which came in reference to the Iraqi position was emphasized in the Iraqi president’s Ahmad Hasan Baker inaugural statement in the Ninth Arab Summit in Baghdad. The Iraqi Revolution Council’s statement called on the Syrian government to cooperate with the Iraqi demands to send military forces to face the “enemy” in response to the agreement; in addition to demanding Egypt to immediately withdraw from the agreement. In return, Iraq would supply Egypt’s needs by establishing an Arab national fund to support Egypt and the battle fronts, in addition to the PLO’s needs and to provide support for “the Palestinian Arab people’s steadfastness in the occupied territories” (IPS, 1978, p. 184). This was raised in the Ninth Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1978.

Amidst all the previously mentioned positions and levels of rejection which utilized expressions such as “Zionist penetration”, “collaboration”, “taming”, “alliance with America and the Zionist”, “submissive mentality”, “defeatist”, and “peaceful settlement” to describe the relationship with the Zionist (the other) during the Camp David era, none of them used the term “normalization”, to
describe the treaty nor to describe Sadat, despite the fact that they all came from a position which rejects “normalization” with the colonial system in varying degrees.

6. The emergence of the term normalization in the statements of rejection in Egypt, 1978

Apparently, the discourse of anti-normalization was first used in Egypt, where the “peace” treaty was created. The signing of Camp David had a tremendous effect on the Egyptian people themselves, where many, including politicians, officials, and regular folk, declared their rejection of the treaty. For example, three heads of the Egyptian Council of Ministers resigned in objection to the treaty (For more information, refer to, Kamel, 1984). Adding to that, the Revolution’s Leadership Council’s memorandum of July 23 to President Anwar Sadat (Cairo, 01\10\1978), which started with:

Let it be known, Mr. President, and let all citizens understand, that we are like the rest of our people in our pursuit of peace, and that our ultimate purpose is to liberate our land from the corruption of the Israeli occupation. However, we know, as well, that there is a difference between a peace which achieves justice and security, and national sovereignty which returns rights to their people and achieves peace for them, and a false peace which achieves no justice nor security, one which eliminates the struggles of the past and any hopes for the future (IPS, 1978, p. 161).

The issuers of the memorandum objected to Israel’s terms which dictated the establishment of normal relations before achieving full withdrawal from Sinai and before achieving a comprehensive agreement with all the different parties, explaining that Israel’s purpose is to achieve dominance on economics, and that this is “in conflict with the Arab League’s charter, and the League’s joint defence treaties, and cultural and economic agreements, in addition to collaborative economic projects ”(IPS, 1978, p. 165). The members of the Leadership of the Egyptian Revolution Council proposed questions about the impact of the treaty of Egypt’s relationship with the Arab nation after “it collaborated with, and befriended the Zionist thought” and “What sort of havoc would this wreak on the minds of Egyptian youth as they attempt to interpret this new friendship with Israel? And how can they accept this and the relationship with the rest of the Arab world?” (IPS, 1978, p. 165).

In the same year of 1978, and in response to the Camp David accords, the term normalization was heavily present in the statement of the National Progressive Unionist Party in Egypt, (Cairo, 25\09\1978), which presented a detailed critical statement about the Camp David Accords, discussing the Egyptian relationship with Israel (the status of Sinai), and Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians and the Arab states, while heavily criticizing Sadat’s abandonment of his previous statements, that “normalizing relations with Israel, and exchanging of diplomatic representation is not possible at all”, and that (Sadat) “made a commitment in front of the American president Carter that it may be possible to consider normalizing relations with Israel, provided that it be 5 years after withdrawing all Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, and after the Palestinian people receive all their national rights they are entitled to” (IPS, 1978, p. 149). In other words,
Sadat submitted to the Israeli terms of *normalization* even before implementation of the UN resolutions and before the withdrawal from Sinai.

As for the second mention, it was in the National Progressive Unionist Party’s statement, which utilized the term *normalization* in the fourth point of the statement, under the title: “Repercussions of *normalization* with Israel on Egypt’s sovereignty” (IPS, 1978, p. 152), in which they warn against the political, economic, cultural, and historic dangers of *normalization*. For example, the statement says, in warning against the dangers of cultural *normalization*:

> Egypt will be the door through which Zionist, racist Israeli culture will enter the region, and all the contradictions it imposes against the Arab, Islamic, Christian culture. Egypt would have to rewrite the national history and culture that is taught to our children in schools and universities to include Israel, the new friendly neighbour, in the Egyptian consciousness, in a brazen challenge to the national, religious emotions (IPS, 1978, p. 152).

Since the year of 1978, cultural movements were initiated within the Egyptian community aiming at fighting *normalization* and spreading awareness of its dangers, such as the Arab Culture Defence Committee in Cairo, established in 1979, whose activities were dominant in unions and professional associations, which also move on to other Arab countries later.

Considering the Arab Cultural Committees’ statements, it is clear that the anti-normalization rhetoric has two levels: the first rejects *normalization*, in the sense of refusal to recognize the state of Israel and the Zionist agenda altogether due to the belief that it is impossible to coexist with as “a threat to the Arab liberation and to the region’s nations’ aspirations for a better future”. As for the second level, it is a conditional rejection, i.e. a refusal, “tentatively”, to normalize relation and to recognize the state of Israel before the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (Committee for the Defence of Arab culture-Cairo, 1993, p. 20).

**Discussion**

Dealing with *normalization* in the previous literature was limited to historical and political analysis of the Israeli motives of *normalization* and the threats and forms of *normalization* at the global and local levels. Emphasis was also placed on the role of normalization in the identification of Arabs within the new Middle Eastern identity, an identity that accepts and treats the colonial entity as a natural structure.

As a development of these literatures, the current research questions attempted to track the genealogy of the term *normalization* in the Arab context. Two hypotheses were addressed; the first assumes that there are differences regarding the emergence of the term *normalization*, phonologically and practice wise. The investigation of this hypothesis reveals that the practice of what we call today “normalization”, in the meaning of acceptance of the settler colonial structure in Palestine, had started before the term of *normalization* appeared. Additionally, this genealogical investigation reveals that the emergence of this terminology was a result of the asymmetrical power
relations between Arabs and Israelis, as it was imposed by a colonial condition of reconciliation process in 1978. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the adaptation of the term “normalization” from the formal usage within Camp David peace accord to the popular usage has emerged in the opposing political powers as a reaction not a response (Fanon’s expression, 1963) to the colonial demand of normalization. The result corresponds to the mission of critical discourse analysis, which is to uncover how the discourse produces and reproduces power relations within the identity policies of the oppressors and the oppressed (Wodak & Fairclough, 2013). This means internalization by the subordinate groups of colonial terminology; in other words, falling in the trap of “the will of power” (Nietzsche, 1967). Moreover, the analysis reveals that there were different kinds of acceptance and rejection of the settler colonialism in Palestine that emerged through history. A fact that goes beyond the clear boundaries of the binary of acceptance and rejection mentioned in the traditional historical practices. This paper proves a historical existence of a continuum of acceptance and rejection of the Zionist settler colonialism, confirming the applicability of the genealogical method with the goal of deconstruction.

It was obvious that the age of reconciliation with the settler colonial entity had begun; it began with the Camp David accords which resulted to explicit division in the Arab League (i.e. the Arab states), between acceptance and rejection. Testing the second hypothesis reveals that at this historical moment a new moral system of beliefs and terminological aspects had changed from the duality of stigmatizing the “in-group” vs. “out-group” members as a (national patriots vs. traitors) to the duality of (normalizer and anti-normalization person). However, I believe that the use of the term normalization in the anti-normalization discourse has contributed to an epistemological shift in the resisting discourse of the anti-Zionist Arab movements. Such use of the term “normalization” (as derived from international law, referring to the establishment of normal relations between two states) is a form of reaction to reconciliation accords, and is considered to be a trap that is part of the negotiations’ linguistic arsenal. The term normalization, itself, implies recognition of the settler colonial entity, and presents the problem (conflict) with the settler colonial entity as one which revolves around establishing normal relations with this entity. The libertarian discourse is supposed to utilize its own libertarian linguistic arsenal.

The adaptation of the term “normalization” by some resistance movements means agreeing to normalize the term “normalization.” This leads the colonized to view their demands as viewed by the colonizer, and to express their liberty and their pursuit for liberty in accordance with the discourse and political standards that are put forward by the colonizer. This will necessarily affect the limits and standards of the Arab national and regional identities, and the relationship with the Zionist (the other). In Fanon’s theorising about the psychology of the colonized and colonizers’ interaction, where he was influenced by the theory of the philosophy of recognition - Sartre’s recognition philosophy and Hegel’s master and slave relations philosophy -. Fanon concluded: when the Black seeks freedom and justice, the image is drawn to both freedom and justice being made as White. In other words, the colonized seek the recognition of the colonizers through internalizing their perceptions towards the relations between them (Fanon, 2008).

The anti-normalization discourse has contributed to erasing the former libertarian linguistic system based on terms such as “betrayal”, “collaboration”, “taming”, and “penetration”. Normalization, itself, allows for mechanisms and acts which reduce the sense of betrayal or collaboration with the colonial system. According to the social psychology, one of the critical approaches to studying the development of social identity states that in studying identity related discourse analysis, language
is not seen as just a vessel to convey thought, but is also a generator and a controller of thought (Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997). Some concepts and terms imply that acts and a complete system of thought accompany used terms. For example, using the term “betrayal”, which was more dominant than the terms “collaboration” and “normalization”, implies certain acts and reactions, relating to certain social standards and social/political punishment, in addition to psychological burdens that accompany the abandonment of the group, and of the libertarian component of resistance as a group’s national and cultural identity. This is a linguistic shift in the discourse used by the resistance forces; even if the term normalization is used to carry the same burden as betrayal, it underwent epistemological shift in time where the term normalization’s indications have limited the concept of collaboration into the forming relations with the colonizer, excluding recognition and the acceptance of the settler colonial regime.

**Limitation**

Despite the contribution of this research in tracking the emergence of the term normalization and its consequences within the Arab perceptions, it is important to note that this research has been limited to analysing the linguistic level of political discourse, and it did not address the economic, social and cultural factors, despite their importance in dealing with the phenomenon of normalization.

I assume that the present study is the first attempt to examine the phenomenon of normalization of the official political discourse phonology. Future researches should pursue this analysis of normalization to the Arab public and media discourses; and should also include critical analysis of the role of socio-economic factors in shaping normalization. In a future research, I aim to analyse the political discourse on normalization within the Palestinian context (Palestinians within the Israeli society, “West Bank”/Jerusalem and Gaza).

**Conclusion**

Patrice Wolfe concluded that settler colonialism is “a structure not an event” (Wolfe, 2006). The results of the present analysis confirm that ‘normalization’ with the settler colonial entity in Palestine was not an event that emerged in 1978, but a structural process. One of the main roles of discourse is its ability to “sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 303). Recently, the discourse addressing the term “normalization” to describe relationships with settler colonial entity is widely spread, not only on the regional level, but also globally. This confirms the hegemony of the terminology of the colonial forces; according to Wodak & Fairclough, “when people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, one arrives at the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1978)” (2013, p. 306). Perhaps this paper contributes to influencing the present by opening up other narratives that may contribute to the use of different terminologies to describe the relations with Israelis, beyond the hegemony of the colonial power terminologies.
References


Bhabha, H. K. (2012). *The Location of Culture*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203820551


